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Ross v. Moffitt: The End of the Griffin-Douglas Line
In 1963, in the landmark case of Douglas v. California,1 the Supreme
Court declared that an indigent defendant had a constitutional right to the
assistance of counsel on appeal. In the course of its opinion, the majority
stated hat there could "be no equal justice where the kind of an appeal a
man enjoys 'depends on the amount of money he has.' "2 Although this
statement could be used to support much wider implications, the holding was
expressly limited to the assistance of counsel on the first appeal of right,3
the only issue before the Court.4
The Douglas decision generated significant controversy and commentary.5
Since the Court had restricted the reach of the holding, one major focus of
the commentary was the extension of the right to the assistance of counsel
,to further appeals.0 Five federal courts of appeals and at least one state
supreme court addressed the question with differing results.1  Finally,
1. 372 U.S. 353 (1963).
2. Id. at 356, quoting Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12, 19 (1956).
3. The oft-quoted limiting passage was: "We are dealing only with the first appeal,
granted as a matter of right to rich and poor alike, from a criminal conviction." Id.
at 356 (citation omitted).
4. The petitioners in Douglas challenged the state practice of the appellate court
first conducting an independent review of the record of an indigent's trial before passing
on a request for the assistance of counsel.
5. See, e.g., Bennett, Right to Counsel-A Due Process Requirement, 23 LA. L. Rev.
662 (1963); Clark, The Sixth Amendment and the Law of the Land, 8 ST. Louis LJ.
1 (1963); Fontron, Appellate Counsel for the Indigent Accused, 6 WASHBURN L.J. 417
(1967); Mazor, The Right to be Provided Counsel: Variation on a Familiar Theme,
9 UTAH L. REv. 50 (1964).
6. See, e.g., Day, Coming: The Right to Have Assistance of Counsel at All Ap-
pellate Stages, 52 A.B.A.J. 135 (1966).
7. See Mitchell v. Johnson, 488 F.2d 349 (6th Cir. 1973) (refusal to appoint counsel
to assist indigent in preparing application for discretionary review to state supreme court
violated constitutional rights); Moffitt v. Ross, 483 F.2d 650 (4th Cir. 1973) (indigent
defendant entitled to assigned counsel in seeking discretionary review in state's highest
court and in United States Supreme Court); United States ex rel. Pennington v. Pate,
409 F.2d 757 (7th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 1042 (1970) (refusal to appoint
counsel on appeal to state's highest court not violative of indigent's rights); Peters v.
Cox, 341 F.2d 575 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 863 (1965) (refusal of state su-
preme court to appoint counsel to assist in appeal to United States Supreme Court not
violative of the Constitution); United States ex rel. Coleman v. Denno, 313 F.2d 457
(2d Cir.) (decided two months prior to Douglas), cert. denied, 373 U.S. 919 (1963)
(two months after Douglas) (furnishing of counsel at all stages of the state appellate
system except in post-conviction action in federal system, including writ of certiorari to
the Supreme Court, upheld as satisfying the Griffin principle). The state supreme court
decision that directly considers the issue is Hutchins v. State, 504 S.W.2d 758 (Tenn.
1974) (indigent defendant entitled to assistance of counsel when seeking discretionary
appeal).
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last term, the Supreme Court resolved the issue in Ross v. Moffit.8  The
Court held that the rule requiring appointment of counsel on the first appeal
as of right did not extend to further discretionary state appeals or to applica-
tions for review in the Supreme Court.
Respondent Moffitt, an indigent, was originally tried and convicted of
felonies in two separate North Carolina state court actions.9 On his appeals
of right, the convictions were affirmed. 10 Following further action in the
state courts," he sought writs of habeas corpus in two federal district courts, 12
alleging a denial of a constitutional right in the state's refusal to appoint
counsel to assist him in seeking discretionary review. Both district courts re-
fused to issue the writs. On appeal to the Fourth Circuit, the cases were
merged and a constitutional right to the assistance of appointed counsel on
discretionary appeals was found.' 8  The Supreme Court granted certiorari
and reversed the court of appeals, restricting the right of appointed counsel
to the first appeal of right.' 4
This Note will examine this denial of the extension of the right to assist-
ance of counsel on second or discretionary appeals in light of the right to
such assistance on the first appeal of right as guaranteed by Douglas. If an
indigent defendant has the right to counsel on the first appeal, why do con-
stitutional dictates not require that this right extend to subsequent appeals?
I. THE Griffin-Douglas LINE
Although Supreme Court jurisdiction to review and thereby directly in-
8. 417 U.S. 600 (1974).
9. Moffitt was convicted of forging and uttering forged instruments in two different
North Carolina counties, Mecklenburg and Guilford.
10. See State v. Moffitt, 11 N.C. App. 337, 181 S.E.2d 184 (Ct. App. 1971) (Guil-
ford); State v. Moffitt, 9 N.C. App. 694, 177 S.E.2d 324 (Ct. App. 1970) (Mecklen-
burg).
11. In the Mecklenburg County case, Moffitt's appointed attorney was denied further
appointment to prepare a writ of certiorari to the North Carolina Supreme Court. In
the Guilford County case, however, the appointed attorney was authorized to prepare
the writ, which he did. The North Carolina Supreme Court dismissed the petition for
lack of a substantial constitutional question. State v. Moffitt, 279 N.C. 396, 183 S.E.2d
247 (1971). Moffitt then asked the trial and first appellate courts to appoint counsel
to assist him in preparing a writ of certiorari to the United States Supreme Court. This
request was denied.
12. Petitioner sought the writs in the United States District Court for the Western
District of North Carolina (Mecklenburg) and United States District Court for the Mid-
dle District of North Carolina (Guilford).
13. Moffitt v. Ross, 483 F.2d 650 (4th Cir. 1973). The court noted the holding in
Douglas and stated that it could "find no basis for differentiation between appeals as
of right and permissive appeals or between first appeals and second or third stage re-
view." id. at 651.
14. Ross v. Moffitt, 417 U.S. 600 (1974).
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fluence state criminal procedures was declared early in our history, 15 the
almost routine involvement that exists today is of relatively recent origin. 16
Not until the early decades of this century did the Court, first in Moore v.
Dempsey,17 and then in Powell v. Alabama,18 clearly begin to evaluate the
processes and procedures of state criminal trials. The initial and main
ground for this modern involvement was the due process clause of the four-
teenth amendment.' 9 However, in Griffin v. Illinois,20 Douglas' most direct
predecessor, the Court was presented with a question involving rights and
procedures required on an appeal from a criminal conviction. Since an early
Court decision, McKane v. Durston,2' had held that the Constitution did not
require the states to provide any appellate review at all, the Court could not
describe the procedure at issue in Griffin22 as a failure to provide due process
without overruling McKane-a step that the Griffin Court was unwilling to
take. 23  In order to resolve this dilemma, Justice Black, writing for four
Justices, made, in the words of one commentator, "a cursory bow to the due
process clause" 24 but ended by holding that "Illinois denied the petitioners
the equal protection of the laws."' 25  Justice Frankfurter joined with the
plurality to the extent of concurring in the judgment. However, he rejected
the due process analysis and based his opinion solely on the equal protection
15. See Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264 (1821). In Cohens, the defend-
ants appealed a conviction in a Virginia court for selling lottery tickets. Virginia asserted
that the Supreme Court did not have jurisdiction to hear the appeal. Chief Justice
Marshall disagreed and affirmed the Court's power to review state criminal proceedings.
16. An extensive treatment of this evolution is contained in Allen, The Supreme
Court and State Criminal Justice, 4 WAYNE L. REV. 191 (1958).
17. 261 U.S. 86 (1923).
18. 287 U.S. 45 (1932).
19. See, e.g., DeMeerleer v. Michigan, 329 U.S. 663, 665 (1947) ("petitioner was
deprived of rights essential to a fair hearing"); Hawk v. Olson, 326 U.S. 271, 278-79
(1945) ("he has not had the kind of trial in a state court which the due process clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment requires"); Williams v. Kaiser, 323 U.S. 471, 476 (1944)
("petitioner was denied due process of law"); Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 71
(1932) ("the failure of the trial court to make an effective appointment of counsel was
likewise a denial of due process").
20. 351 U.S. 12 (1956).
21. 153 U.S. 684 (1894).
22. The contested procedure in Griffin was the requirement of a transcript of the
trial court proceedings as a prerequisite to the granting of appellate review and the de-
nial of a free transcript to indigents.
23. See Willcox & Bloustein, The Griffin Case-Poverty and the Fourteenth Amend-
ment, 43 CORNELL L.Q. 1, 11 n.40 (1957), for the suggestion that this deference to Mc-
Kane was unwarranted since, were the issue of appeals faced squarely today, the Court
would decide McKane differently.
24. Allen, supra note 16, at 198.
25. Id.
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clause. 20
The holding in Griffin, and the uncertainty of the basis for the decision,
led to extensive discussion.27  One of the key questions centered on the right
to have counsel appointed, 28 not only on appeal, but also on a uniform basis
at state criminal trials. 29  These dual concerns were resolved the same day
and in a way that helped clarify Griffin and distinguish the basis for its hold-
ing. On March 18, 1963, the Court decided two "right to counsel" cases,
Gideon v. Wainwright30 and Douglas v. California.31  It is of particular
significance that, although the two decisions involved the appointment of
counsel for indigent defendants and had the similar result of guaranteeing
counsel to indigents, the difference in the level at which this right was sought
led to completely different analyses. Indeed, in Gideon, no mention was
made of the language in Griffin which noted that "[t]here can be no equal
justice where the kind of trial a man gets depends on the amount of money
he has" 32 -a statement that would seem to bear directly on the question of
appointed counsel for an indigent at the trial level raised in Gideon."3
Perhaps even more significant was the failure of the Douglas majority even
to mention Gideon. As expressed by Justice Harlan in his dissent in Douglas,
if the right to have counsel appointed "may be viewed as one of equal protec-
tion .. .the Court's analysis of that right in [Gideon] is wholly unneces-
26. "I]t is now settled that due process of law does not require a State to afford
review of criminal judgments." 351 U.S. at 21 (Frankfurter, J., concurring). But cf.
Willcox & Bloustein, supra note 23, at 10: "Frankfurter's concurring opinion ...said
that Illinois had denied equal protection. He may have meant that, by denying equal
protection in this kind of case, it had denied due process as well. We think he did."
27. See, e.g., Allen, supra note 16; Hamley, The Impact of Griffin v. Illinois on State
Court-Federal Court Relationships, 24 F.R.D. 75 (1958); Schaefer, Federalism and
State Criminal Procedure, 70 HAiv. L. REv. 1 (1956); Willcox & Bloustein, supra note
23.
28. See Schaefer, supra note 27, at 10, for his comment, as a Justice of the Illinois
Supreme Court, that "[t]he analogy to the right to counsel is close indeed: if a state al-
lows one who can afford to retain a lawyer to be represented by counsel, and so to ob-
tain a different kind of trial, it must furnish the same opportunity to those who are un-
able to hire a lawyer."
29. Subsequent to Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45 (1932), the Supreme Court limited
the right to appointed counsel at trial by its decision in Betts v. Brady, 316 U.S. 455
(1942). That decision eliminated a consistent guarantee of appointment and substituted
an affirmative showing of need for counsel before appointment would be made.
30. 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
31. 372 U.S. 353 (1963).
32. 351 U.S. at 19.
33. Rather than rely on the quoted language from Griffin, the Gideon Court found
that, since the appointment of counsel was "fundamental and essential to a fair trial,"
the fourteenth amendment made the sixth amendment's guarantee "obligatory upon the
States." 372 U.S. at 342.
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sary. 1"3 As a result of the decision in Douglas, especially when contrasted
with Gideon, it became clear that the Griffin and Douglas cases represented
the introduction of an equal protection analysis into the realm of state crim-
inal procedure. However, an examination of the two cases indicates that it
is not a simple equal protection analysis.85  Rather, the Court seemed delib-
erately unclear"6 on precisely what was happening, beyond the fact that the
fourteenth amendment guaranteed indigent defendants certain rights, among
which was the right to counsel on the first appeal of right.
As with most landmark Supreme Court decisions, the immediate concern
was far less with the instant result of Douglas than with its future impact
on the law. It was here that the lack of clarity, as to the basis for the right
identified in Douglas, was most critical. Since the decision was not based
on a traditional due process analysis, and since much of the Court's reasoning
and wording reflected an equal protection thrust,37 many commentators
stressed the equal protection grounds 8 while paying little heed to the due
process concerns expressed in the opinion.89 One flaw in this interpretation
of Douglas is that there would be no practical limit to the sweep of the de-
cision. As one commentator expressed it: "[T]he logic of the equal protec-
tion argument can hardly recognize any limit imposed by poverty alone."' 40
Justice Harlan expressed similar thoughts in his dissent in Douglas. His
reading of the majority opinion was that the right identified did stem from
an equal protection analysis. He also criticized the majority's limitation of
the guarantee to the first appeal: "Surely, it cannot be contended that the
requirements of fair procedure are exhausted once an indigent has been given
one appellate review."'4 1
One commentator who accepted the proposition that the basis for the de-
34. 372 U.S. at 363 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
35. The main support for this contention comes from references in the two opinions
to "fairness" and "fair procedure," phrases usually restricted to due process examina-
tions. Cf. Developments in the Law-Equal Protection, 82 HARv. L. REV. 1065, 1180
n.78 (1969) ("[t]he equal protection clause . . . normally operated only by comparing
how some people are treated with how others are treated without itself setting minimum
standards of treatment").
36. See The Supreme Court, 1962 Term, 77 HARv. L. REV. 62, 107 (1963) ("[iln the
1963 cases and those which preceded them, the Court has maintained an ambiguity as
to the ground of decision which seems too consistent to have been fortuitous").
37. The Douglas opinion's use of such language as "invidious discrimination" sup-
ports such a view. See 372 U.S. at 355.
38. See, e.g., Day, supra note 6.
39. In addition to the phrases noted above, see note 35 supra, the Court seemed to
be expressing due process concerns when it characterized the appeal without assistance
of counsel as "a meaningless ritual." 372 U.S. at 358.
40. Day, supra note 6, at 137.
41. 372 U.S. at 366 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
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cision was to be found in both the equal protection clause and the due pro-
cess clause suggested that this approach represented the Court's balancing
"what it foresees as constitutionally desirable, and what it senses to be pre-
sently practical."' 42 Further, this use of the due process clause enabled the
Court to "posit a principle which is realistic for the time, and yet remains
sufficiently flexible to accommodate some future expansion. '43
Whether it was this desire for flexibility that led the Court to be less than
clear as to the precise nature of the Douglas decision, or whether the equal
protection analysis was the real basis44 and the references to the due process
clause were made merely to bolster the holding," 5 it was clear that the right
to counsel on appeals after the first appeal of right remained an open
question.
II. THE Moffitt INTERPRETATION OF Griffin-Douglas
In reaching its decision in Moiiitt that the guarantee described in Douglas
did not, in fact, extend past the first appeal, the Court acknowledged that
the "precise rationale for the Griffin and Douglas lines of cases has never
been explicitly stated . . . . 46 However, instead of proceeding on an
analysis that recognized at least a partial integration of due process and equal
protection, a course suggested not only by the Griffin and Douglas cases but
42. Steele, The Doctrine of Right to Counsel: Its Impact on the Administration of
Criminal Justice and the Legal Profession, 23 Sw. L.J. 488, 492 (1969).
43. Id.
44. Although hardly persuasive, statements by three of the Justices from the Douglas
Court can be read as support for the proposition that the real basis for the decision
was equal protection. See Clark, Gideon Revisited, 15 ARIZ. L. REV. 343, 352 (1973)
("equal protection analysis has not played a significant role ... outside of [Griffin
and Douglas]"); Douglas, The Right to Counsel-A Foreward, 45 MINN. L. REv. 693
(1961) ("[tlhe refusal to recognize the right of counsel in every criminal case has long
seemed to me to be a denial of the equal protection of the law"); Goldberg, Equality
and Governmental Action, 39 N.Y.U.L. REv. 205, 218 (1964) ("in Griffin v. Illinois,
... the Court made its first broad pronouncement in the area of economic equality in
the criminal process").
45. The precise basis for the guarantee of the assistance of counsel did not present
an obstacle to lower courts when the question was within the boundary established by
Douglas. See, e.g., Nelson v. Peyton, 415 F.2d 1154, 1157 (4th Cir. 1969), where the
court discussed the right to counsel:
At times cast in terms of a defendant's right to counsel under the Sixth Amend-
ment, as made applicable to the states by the Fourteenth Amendment, in terms
of the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, standing alone, in
terms of the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, or in terms
of a combination of these, the recent trend of decisions makes clear that every
defendant has the unqualified right, whether or not indigent, to be represented
by counsel at all critical stages of any prosecution against him.
46. 417 U.S. at 608 (footnote omitted).
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by other cases and commentary as well, 47 the Court purported to sever the
two concepts so as to make separate due process and equal protection
determinations.
In making the due process analysis, the Court first noted that in defining
due process the emphasis was on fairness. 48 Next, a differentiation was
made between the function of counsel at trial49 and on appeal. 50  This
difference is important, the Court insisted, because "while no one would agree
that the State may simply dispense with the trial stage ...it is clear that
the State need not provide any appeal at all." 51 In stating this conclusion,
however, the Court made no attempt to distinguish Douglas, where counsel
was provided on appeal. Also, the Court made no mention of language in
other criminal procedure cases that described the state's responsibility once
a system of appellate review is established.5 2  Instead, the Court noted that
unfairness would result only "if indigents are singled out . . . and denied
meaningful access . . .because of their poverty. '5 3  To address this final
due process concern the Court turned to an equal protection analysis.
Although it would seem that this transition from a due process analysis
to one of equal protection was an affirmation of the overlap of the two con-
cepts as recognized in Douglas, the Court discussed equal protection inde-
pendently. In defining equal protection, the Court stated that the concept
emphasized "disparity in treatment. '5 4  The Court first noted language in
Douglas that showed an equal protection treatment" and then quoted from
Burns v. Ohio56 to show other equal protection language in a case involving
an indigent defendent:
47. See Wilson, The Merging Concepts of Liberty and Equality, 12 WASH. & LEE L.
REV. 182 (1955), for a historical treatment of the overlap and merger of the two con-
cepts. See also Boiling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497, 499 (1953) ("[blut the concepts of equal
protection and due process, both stemming from our American ideal of fairness, are not
mutually exclusive").
48. 407 U.S. at 609.
49. Id. at 610-11 ("a shield to protect [the defendant] against being . .. stripped
of his presumption of innocence").
50. Id. at 611 ("a sword to upset the prior determination of guilt").
51. id.
52. See, e.g., Rinaldi v. Yeager, 384 U.S. 305, 310 (1965) ("it is now fundamental
that, once [avenues of review are] established, these avenues must be kept free of unrea-
soned distinctions").
53. 417 U.S. at 611.
54. Id. at 609.
55. "[W]here the merits of the one and only appeal an indigent has as of right are
decided without benefit of counsel, we think an unconstitutional line has been drawn
between rich and poor." Id. at 611, quoting 372 U.S. at 357.
56. 360 U.S. 252 (1959). In Burns, decided after Griffin but before Douglas, the
Court held that Ohio's practice of according each person whose conviction has been af-
[Vol. 24:314
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[O]nce the state chooses to establish appellate review in criminal
cases, it may not foreclose indigents from access to any phase of
that procedure because of their poverty. . . . This principle is no
less applicable where the state has afforded an indigent defendant
access to the first phase of its appellate procedure but has effec-
tively foreclosed access to the second phase of that procedure solely
because of his indigency. 57
The language from Burns would seem to support a similar extension of
Douglas to second appeals. However, rather than distinguishing Burns, or
otherwise limiting the meaning of the quoted statements,58 the Court pro-
ceeded on an independent equal protection analysis to determine if, in fact,
the equal protection clause mandated appointment of counsel for second or
discretionary appeals.
The Court began the equal protection analysis by citing an earlier case
for the proposition that there is a tendency for "all rights '.to declare them-
selves absolute to their logical extreme.' 59 Notwithstanding this tendency,
there are "limits beyond which the equal protection analysis may not be
pressed." 60  So fortified, the Court cited a number of cases, beginning with
San Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriguez.61 This decision was
cited for the proposition that "the Fourteenth Amendment 'does not require
absolute equality or precisely equal advantages.' 62 Next, the Court listed
a number of the Grilfin-Douglas line of cases63 as a prelude to what appears
to be the crux of the majority opinion: "[W]e do not believe that the Equal
Protection Clause . . . in the context of these cases, requires North Carolina
firmed by its court of appeals the right to apply to the Ohio Supreme Court for leave
to appeal, could not be denied an indigent defendant solely because of inability to pay
the required filing fee. The state's contention that Griffin was distinguishable, since
here the defendant had received one appellate review of his conviction, was rejected by
the Court.
57. Id. at 257 (citation omitted).
58. One possibility would be to limit the reach of Griffin and Burns to the issue of
access to the appellate court and follow this line of reasoning by showing that assistance
of counsel is not required to gain access. Although there was some sentiment for so
limiting Griffin, see, e.g., 55 MIcH. L. REV. 413, 420 (1957), the sweeping language in
Douglas clearly countered such a reading. See 27 VAND. L. REV. 365, 370 n.26 (1974).
59. 417 U.S. at 611-12. The case cited as the source of this phrase was Hudson
Water Co. v. McCarter, 209 U.S. 349 (1908), which involved state police power as used
to regulate water rights within the state. Its applicability to an equal protection analysis
was not developed.
60. 417 U.S. at 612.
61. 411 U.S. 1 (1973).
62. 417 U.S. at 612, quoting 411 U.S. at 24.
63. The Court cited Griffin, Rinaldi, Douglas, Draper v. Washington, 372 U.S. 487
(1963), and Lane v. Brown, 372 U.S. 477 (1963).
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to provide free counsel for indigent defendants seeking to take discretionary
appeals .... ,,04 The remainder of the equal protection analysis is a support-
ing rationale for this opinion as it focuses on the discretionary mandate of the
North Carolina Supreme Court.05 The Court acknowledged that a defendant
represented by counsel, especially "one trained in -the somewhat arcane art of
preparing petitions for discretionary review," 66 would be in a better position
relative to an indigent proceeding pro se in seeking this discretionary review.
However, the majority viewed this situation as leaving the unrepresented in-
digent only "somewhat handicapped in comparison with a wealthy defen-
dant."'6 7 Further, this inequality between the two classes of defendants did
not mean that the state had failed in its duty to "assure the indigent defen-
dant an adequate opportunity to present his claims fairly in the context of
the state's appellate process." s68 And, with emphasis on the fairness of the
contested procedure, a traditional due process concern, 69 the Court concluded
the equal protection analysis.
The final section of the majority opinion applied the equal protection
analysis70 to the question of appointing counsel for a defendant seeking re-
view in the Supreme Court of the United States. The main thrust of this
section was that the right to review in the Supreme Court was not a product
of state action and, therefore, ,the Griffin-Douglas rationale was not appli-
cable. However, no mention was made of the fairness of differentiating be-
tween rich and poor defendants, a question which was addressed in the dis-
cussion of this right in the context of the state system.
Justice Douglas' brief dissent was limited to an affirmation of Chief Judge
Haynsworth's view for the Fourth Circuit.71 Justice Douglas noted that the
64. 417 U.S. at 612.
65. The statute governing discretionary appeals, N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7A-31 (1967),
limits the certification to those cases which: (1) have subject matter of significant pub-
lic interest or (2) involve legal principles of major significance or (3) are decisions of
the court of appeals that are likely to be in conflict with a decision of the state supreme
court. The U.S. Supreme Court felt that this discretionary character obviated, to a de-
gree, the need for a lawyer. But see note 88 Infra.
66. 417 U.S. at 616.
67. id.
68. Id. at 617.
69. See, e.g., Developments in the Law, supra note 35, at 1180 n.78. "Under a due
process analysis the Court, in the name of 'fundamental fairness,' sought to establish a
set of standards below which a state was not permitted to fall even if in so falling it
treated all persons equally."
70. While not applying the equal protection analysis in so many words, the Court
refers to the discussion "in the preceding section," the section focusing on equal protec-
tion. 417 U.S. at 616.
71. Writing for himself and Justices Brennan and Marshall, Justice Douglas said: "I
am in agreement with the opinion of Chief Judge Haynsworth for a unanimous panel
in the Court of Appeals." Id. at 619.
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decision in Douglas was limited to the first appeal because that was the only
issue before the Court at the time. The dissent asserted that Douglas "was
grounded on concepts of fairness and equality" 7 2 and voiced support for the
Fourth Circuit's view that the "same concepts of fairness and equality, which
require counsel in the first appeal of right, require counsel in other and
subsequent discretionary appeals."73
III. A BRIEF PROBING OF Moffitt
Although the Court disavowed the approach of integrating due process and
equal protection in Moffitt, it is arguable that the actual analysis used recog-
nized such an overlap. Once this similarity of approach is recognized, the
question is why the Court arrived at the result it did rather than extending
the right identified in Douglas to later appeals.
The particular procedural history74 of Moffitt may have been a key factor
that dictated the Court's decision. By virtue of the two separate cases, the
issue of appointed counsel on discretionary review was raised in relation both
to state courts as well as to the Supreme Court. While the bulk of the
majority opinion dealt with the question in the context of proceedings in state
courts, considerations of the impact on the Supreme Court may have influ-
enced the decision in two ways. First, the right to review in the Supreme
Court is not state-created. During oral argument, Justice White expressed
concern that placing the financial burden on the states to provide counsel to
assist indigents on appeal to the Supreme Court might not be fair. 75 Sec-
ondly, the inclusion of the Supreme Court made the issue directly relevant to
the Court, and an affirmation of the Fourth Circuit's holding would have
acted to invalidate present Court practices.7 6 This very issue of Court prac-
tice was raised in the two dissenting opinions in Douglas,77 and also may have
been at the heart of at least one of the circuit court opinions that conflicted
72. Id. at 621.
73. Id., quoting Moffitt v. Ross, 483 F.2d 655 (4th Cir. 1973).
74. See note 11 supra.
75. See 42 U.S.L.W. 3606 (April 30, 1974).
76. "The Court has steadfastly refused to appoint counsel to assist an unrepresented
indigent, prior to the grant of review, in preparing a petition for certiorari or jurisdic-
tional statement or any other preliminary motion or document." R. STERN & E. GPss-
MAN, SUPREME COURT PRACTICE 378 (4th ed. 1969).
77. "Indeed, if the Court is correct it may be that we should first clean up our own
house. We have afforded indigent litigants much less protection than has California."
372 U.S. at 359 (Clark, J., dissenting). "What the Court finds constitutionally offensive
in California's procedure bears a striking resemblance to the rules of this Court . . .
on petitions for certiorari or for leave to appeal filed by indigent defendants pro se."
372 U.S. at 365 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
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with the Fourth Circuit's opinion in Moffitt.78
A desire on the part of the Court to declare an end point to the Douglas
right may have led to the decision in Moffitt. While the Douglas Court had
limited the right to the question before it, the language and philosophy ex-
pressed in reaching the decision offered support for a wider application.79 By
restricting Douglas to the first appeal of right, the Court may have been sig-
naling an unwillingness to extend the right to appointed counsel to collateral
attacks, petitions for rehearing, or any other post-conviction proceedings.8 0
Foreclosing consideration of further extensions may be desirable in view of the
Court's heavy caseload, as well as the states' interest in having the question
of appointed counsel settled. Such a result would then enable the states to
codify their procedures for assigning counsel to the level required and also
align their state criminal practice with the requirements. 8 '
The significant change in the membership of the Court between Douglas
and Moffitt8 2 is another factor that explains the decision. The decisions of the
Burger Court have shown a different perspective on the rights of criminal
defendants from that of the Warren Court.sa Generally, this different view
has led to an unwillingness to provide new protections or to extend ones pre-
viously announced.8 4  It has also been noted that the Burger Court has a
78. One, example is found in United States ex rel. Pennington v. Pate, 409 F.2d 757
(7th Cir. 1969), where the Court decided that Illinois' failure to appoint counsel for
an appeal to the Illinois Supreme Court did not violate the defendant's constitutional
rights. The court noted: "We find support for our decision in the present practice of
the United States Supreme Court ..... Id. at 760.
79. See p. 314 supra.
80. Chief Justice Burger seemed to express concern about the lack of an end point
when he questioned counsel for the respondent about whether this right to counsel would
extend to a petition for rehearing. See 42 U.S.L.W. 3606 (April 30, 1974).
81. The Commonwealth of Virginia, as amicus curiae, expressed concern that
the decision of the Fourth Circuit would upset the state's criminal justice system. Brief
for Commonwealth of Virginia as Amicus Curiae at 2, Ross v. Moffitt, 417 U.S. 600
(1974).
82. Making up the Douglas majority were Justices Douglas, Brennan, Black, White,
Goldberg, and Chief Justice Warren. Justices Clark, Harlan, and Stewart dissented.
Making up the Moffitt majority were Justices Rehnquist, Powell, Blackmun, Stewart,
White, and Chief Justice Burger. Justices Douglas, Brennan, and Marshall dissented. See
Kurland, The New Supreme Court, 7 JOHN MARSHALL J. OF PRAC. AND PRO. 1 (1973),
for a discussion of the present Court as compared with the previous one. But see Clark,
supra note 44, at 345, where former Justice Clark comments: "[T]he truth about at-
tempts to change the decisions of the Court through appointments to the bench is that
the attempts fail."
83. See Kurland, supra note 82, at 8: "[W]e have already seen that the Burger Court
has drawn back from an extension of the Warren Court's decisions in the area of crim-
inal procedure."
84. See, e.g., United States v. Ash, 413 U.S. 300 (1973) (counsel not necessary at
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view of the equal protection clause differing from that taken by the Warren
Court,85 and, since the Griffin-Douglas cases are at least in part equal protec-
tion cases, this shift in approach could explain the Moffitt decision.
In seeking to understand why the Court decided as it did, one should dis-
cuss some of the arguments that would have supported an opposite result but
that were not compelling enough to persuade a majority of the Court. While
an attempt at defining these arguments must be speculative in nature, some
guidance is available from the opinions of other courts and from the briefs
in this case.
Perhaps the strongest argument against the reasoning used by the majority
is the importance of the assistance of counsel on appeal. The general import-
ance of the assistance of counsel has been recognized from the early criminal
procedure cases to the present.86 The vital role that counsel plays was clearly
voiced in Douglas,8 7 and, as pointed out by the dissent in Moffitt, it was
stressed by the Fourth Circuit in reaching its decision.88 One commentator
has noted that the recognition of this importance of counsel had led to little
resistance to the movement to extend the right to indigents.89  One court,
commenting on the impact of denial of counsel on a second appeal, likened
the result to the "temple of criminal justice" having "three stories for the
affluent and only two for the indigent."90  Recognizing the general practice
post-indictment photo display); Kirby v. Illinois, 406 U.S. 682 (1972) (counsel not re-
quired at pre-indictment showup).
85. See Kurland, supra note 82, at 12.
86. The language of Justice Sutherland in Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 75 (1932),
illustrates the early belief in the importance of counsel:
The right to be heard would be, in many cases, of little avail if it did not com-
prehend the right to be heard by counsel. Even the intelligent and educated
layman has small and sometimes no skill in the science of law .... He re-
quires the guiding hand of counsel at every step in the proceedings against him.
Id. at 68-69.
87. "[T]he rich man, who appeals as of right, enjoys the benefit of counsel's exam-
ination into the record, research of the law, and marshalling of arguments on his be-
half." 372 U.S. at 358.
88. The dissent cited the Fourth Circuit's independent recognition of the importance
of counsel on appeal along with an article quoted by the lower court. 417 U.S. at
621, quoting Moffit v. Ross, 483 F.2d 650, 653 (4th Cir. 1973). The article, Boskey,
The Right to Counsel in Appellate Proceedings, 45 MINN. L. REV. 783, 797 (1967),
noted: "Certiorari practice constitutes a highly specialized aspect of appellate work. The
factors which [the Supreme Court] deems important in connection with deciding
whether to grant certiorari are certainly not within the normal knowledge of an indigent
appellant."
89. Beaney, The Right to Counsel: Past, Present and Future, 49 VA. L. REV. 1150,
1155 (1963).
90. Mitchell v. Johnson, 488 F.2d 349, 353 (6th Cir. 1973).
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of appointing counsel to assist an indigent once certiorari is granted, 91 the
description might be restated to note that all three stories are available to
rich and poor alike, it is just that the indigent must somehow find the third
level without the aid of a stairway.
The Court's result in Moffitt can also be questioned by making a compari-
son with the practice of providing counsel in the federal court system. Once
an indigent establishes the requisite need, counsel is provided through "every
stage of the proceedings"9 2 and this has been construed to include seeking a
writ of certiorari to the Supreme Court.98 One commentator, describing the
sweep of Douglas shortly after that case was decided, suggested that it pro-
vided the state defendant with rights unavailable to the federal defendant. 94
After Moffitt, the opposite situation exists.95
Also standing counter to the majority's result is studied opinion that coun-
sel should be appointed to assist indigents in all appeals. The amicus curiae
brief of the National Legal Aid and Defender Association (NLADA) men-
tioned a number of organizations that support such a result, including an ad-
visory committee of the American Bar Association. 98 Additionally, as
mentioned earlier, various commentators have indicated support for an ex-
tension of Douglas to cover subsequent appeals. 97
One issue that was raised by parties on both sides in Moffitt, but not men-
tioned by the Court, was the question of an increased workload for the bar
if the Fourth Circuit decision was upheld. The briefs supporting reversal
raised the issue9s and claimed that an intolerable burden would ensue, but
91. See R. STERN & E. GRESSMAN, supra note 76, at 378-80.
92. The description of the duration of appointment is from the Criminal Justice Act,
18 U.S.C. § 3006A (1970).
93. For a description of the statutory grounds and an analysis of the extent of the
right, see Doherty v. United States, 404 U.S. 28, 29-36 (1971) (Douglas, J., concurring).
94. Kamisar & Choper, The Right to Counsel in Minnesota: Some Field Findings
and Legal-Policy Observations, 48 MINN. L. REV. 1, 7 (1963).
95. Counsel for Moffitt made this point in the brief to the Supreme Court: "The
federal practice clearly recognizes the value of appointed counsel for indigents seeking
discretionary review by this Court. There is no reason to conclude that state criminal
defendants are any more capable of running the gauntlet alone or that their claims are
less meritorious than their federal counterparts." Brief for Respondent at 11, Ross v.
Moffitt, 417 U.S. 600 (1974).
96. The sources cited as supporting appointment of counsel at all stages of appellate
review were: (1) recommendation of National Advisory Commission on Criminal Jus-
tice Standards and Goals; (2) National Legal Aid and Defender Association, Handbook
of Standards for Legal Aid and Defender Offices (1965); and (3) American Bar Asso-
ciation, Project on Minimum Standards of Criminal Justice (1967). Brief for National
Legal Aid and Defender Association as Amicus Curiae at 8-9, Ross v. Moffitt, 417 U.S.
600 (1974).
97. See notes 5 & 6 supra.
98. The brief for the petitioner, as well as the three amicus curiae briefs from the
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the NLADA amicus brief offered the experience of various defender agencies
as proof that no such increase would result. 99 It may be that the opinion
of Chief Justice Burger in an earlier right to counsel case, that "the dynamics
of the profession have a way of rising to the burdens placed on it"100 pre-
cluded any emphasis on this point in the Moffitt decision.
IV. THE END OF THE Griffin-Douglas LINE
Whatever 'the precise reason for the Moffitt decision, it is clear that the
holding limits a state's requirement to appoint counsel for indigent defendants
to the first appeal of right-the Douglas guarantee.' 0 ' Further, it is clear that
this limitation applies to second and/or discretionary appeals both to the
highest state court and to the United States Supreme Court. Although all
the ramifications of such a holding are not certain, it seems probable that
the underlying philosophy that supported this decision will also bar a finding
of any state duty to appoint counsel on collateral attacks or other post-con-
viction remedies.
One commentator has expressed the view that the Burger Court will not
use the equal protection clause with the frequency or strength that the
Warren Court did, but that the Court will give an increased role to the due
process clause. 02 While the accuracy of this prediction must await the test
of time, it would seem, in light of Moffitt, 'that the projected response to the
equal protection clause can be extended to those times when the two clauses
are intertwined and, as a result, "fairness" will not have an equality facet.'08
states (Illinois, Florida and Virginia), all stressed this point. See, e.g., Brief for State
of Florida as Amicus Curiae at 4, Ross v. Moffit, 417 U.S. 600 (1974): "[r1t is in
the best interest of Florida to appear as amicus curiae in ... opposition to Respondent
Moffitt's position, inasmuch as this single appeal may result ... in excessively burden-
ing the administration of justice in Florida's appellate courts as well as the workload
of those responsible as counsel in certiorari hearings."
99. Brief for National Legal Aid and Defender Association, supra note 96, at 8.
100. Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25, 44 (1972) (Burger, C.J., concurring).
101. The Court did note that there was no intent to discourage "those States which
have, as a matter of legislative choice, made counsel available . . . at all stages of judi-
cial review." 417 U.S. at 618. However, in light of the allegations of the untenable
workload that such a right would create, see note 98 supra, it is unlikely that many
states will seek to provide this protection absent a mandate to do so.
102. See Kurland, supra note 82, at 12.
103. One thoughtful treatment on including the concept of equality within the notion
of fairness can be found in Margolin & Wagner, The Indigent Criminal Defendant and
Defense Services: A Search For Constitutional Standards, 24 HASTINGS L.J. 647 (1973):
Webster defines "fair" as a general term, "[which] implies, negatively, the ab-
sence of injustice or fraud; positively, the putting of all things on an equitable
footing, without undue advantage to any. ... Thus, Webster describes "fair-
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So, unless and until some future Court borrows Justice Black's phrase from
Gideon and describes Moffitt as "an abrupt break with its [the Court's] own
well-considered precedents,"'1 04 the Griffin-Douglas line stops at the first ap-
peal of right for the appointment of counsel. When one is seeking a second
or discretionary review of a criminal conviction, wealth will make a differ-
ence.
William E. Brew
The Continued Vitality of the Standing Doctrine in
Challenges to Federal Government Action
Recent litigation1 in the federal courts has resulted in substantial erosion
of the barriers which had formerly denied standing to citizens and taxpayers
seeking to challenge action by the federal government. 2 So marked has been
this erosion that one court has indicated that, in its circuit, the concept of
standing "has now been almost completely abandoned."3 Indeed, one could
have predicted that the United States Supreme Court would take advantage
ness" Janus-like, facing both towards the language of due process and to equal
protection. Historically, however, the courts became fixated exclusively on the
first part of the definition: if the trial is not "unjust," it could not be "unfair."
Nonetheless, the second part of the definition is equally vital and constitutes
a natural bridge from the historicity of due p:ocess to the latter day strictures
of equal protection. "Without undue advantage to any" commands a clear,
simple, workable test of treatment in lieu of the fuzzy tautology that the "proc-
ess" meted out to a defendant was "due," because neither "fraudulent" nor "un-
just." The very term "justice" thus comes for a redefinition: could that be
just which unduly advantages one party over the other?
Id. at 659 (footnotes omitted).
104. This is Justice Black's characterization of Betts v. Brady, 316 U.S. 455 (1942),
in overruling it in Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 344 (1963).
1. See United States v. Students Challenging Regulatory Agency Procedures
(SCRAP), 412 U.S. 669 (1973); Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727 (1972); Arnold
Tours, Inc. v. Camp, 400 U.S. 45 (1970); Barlow v. Collins, 397 U.S. 159 (1970);
Association of Data Processing Serv. Organizations, Inc. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150 (1970);
Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83 (1968).
2. It should be noted that state courts are generally much more amenable to tax-
payer suits than have been federal courts. See K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
TREATISE 722 (Supp. 1970); Comment, Taxpayers' Suits: A Survey and Summary, 69
YALE L.J. 895, 918-19 (1960).
3. Reservists Comm. to Stop the War v. Laird, 323 F. Supp. 833, 839 (D.D.C.
1971), rev'd sub nom. Schlesinger v. Reservists Comm. to Stop the War, 94 S. Ct. 2925
(1974).
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